Abstract. In a compartmented access structure, there are disjoint participants C1, . . . , Cm. The access structure consists of subsets of participants containing at least ti from Ci for i = 1, . . . , m, and a total of at least t0 participants. Tassa [2] asked: whether there exists an efficient ideal secret sharing scheme for such an access structure? Tassa and Dyn [5] presented a solution using the idea of bivariate interpolation and the concept of dual program [9, 10] . For the purpose of practical applications, it is advantageous to have a simple scheme solving the problem. In this paper a simple scheme is given for this problem using the similar idea from [5] .
Introduction
Shamir [1] and Blake [7] proposed (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, that is, sharing a secret among a given set of n participants, such that every k(k ≤ n) of those participants could recover the secret by pooling their shares together, while no subset of less than k participants can do so. Simmons [3] studied a new structure: compartmented access structure. In this structure, there are different compartments, say C 1 , . . . , C m , and positive integers t 1 , . . . , t m and t 0 , the access structure consists of all subsets containing at least t i participants from C i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and a total of at least t 0 participants. We will restate a formal definition [2] and the related conception [5] here. Remark 1. Simmons' original notion had t 0 = m i=1 , Brickell [4] generalized his notion to t 0 ≥ m i=1 , and we use Brickell's definition.
Definition 1 (Ideality).
A secret sharing scheme with domain of secrets S is ideal if the domain of shares of each user is S. An access structure Γ is ideal if for some finite domain of shares S, there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme realizing it.
Definition 2 (Compartmented Access Structure). Let C be a set of n participants and assume that C is composed of compartments, i.e., C = m i=1 C i where
Brickell [4] studied this structure later, he proved that this access structure is ideal, but the solution scheme he proposed suffered from the same problem of inefficiency as Simmons' schemes [3] did (namely, the dealer must perform possibly exponentially many checks when assigning identities and shares the participants). So Tassa [2] asked: whether there exists an efficient ideal secret sharing scheme for such access structures? Tassa and Dyn [5] answered this question positively. Their idea result from the following conclusion [9, 10] : If an access structure Λ is computed by a monotone span program M, then the dual access structure Λ * is computed by a monotone span program M * of the same size, and M * can be efficiently computed from M. Tassa and Dyn [5] gave a solution to the dual access structure of (1), so they can efficiently construct a solution for (1) . This is a good idea, but hard to understand, and computing M * from M is not an easy work. As a matter of fact, we need not to use the idea of dual span program, just make a little modification of the idea from [5] , then we can get an easier solution for the compartmented access structure (1) . First let us neglect the restriction of ideality, then there is nothing difficult, we describe a solution to realize the weaken version of the compartmented access structure (1) here :
-The secret is S = a 1 + m i=1 b i1 -Each participant c ij from compartment C i will be identified by a unique public point (x ij , y ij ), where x ij = x il for j = l; y ij = y kl for (i, j) = (k, l). and his private share will be (P i (x ij ), R(y ij )).
This idea can be seen as a compound version of shamir's (t,n) threshold, but it is not ideal. In this paper, we try to modify this idea and finally get an ideal scheme, the scheme borrows idea from [5] , especially its proof skills, and the scheme is probabilistic, that is, although V ∈ Γ , sometimes the participants in V cannot recover the secret either, but that is only a small probability event, we will prove this result in the rest of the paper, so the scheme is useful. The paper is organized as followsµin Sect.2, we provide the necessary notation agreements and background, in Sect.3, we will give the revised scheme and prove its validity.
Preliminaries
We begin this section by the description of some notation agreements. Let:
-F is a finite field of size q, and all the operations execute in F.
Next we will introduce a lemma, which provides an upper bound for the number of zeros of a multivariate polynomial over a finite field. and it will play a key role throughout this paper.
. . , z k ) be a nonzero polynomial of k variables over a finite field F of size q. Assume that the highest degree of each of the variables z j in G is no larger than d. Then the number of zeros of G in F k is bounded from above by kdq k−1 .
Proof. The claim is obviously true for k = 1. Proceeding by induction, we assume that it holds for k − 1 variables and prove the claim for k variables. The polynomial G may be written as follows:
For every selection of (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z k−1 ) ∈ F k−1 , there are two possibilities: Either
In the first case, there are at most d values of z k for which G(z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z k ) = 0; in the second case, on the other hand, G(z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z k ) = 0 for all z k ∈ F. By the induction assumption, the number of points (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z k−1 ) ∈ F k−1 of the second kind, denoted herein , satisfies
New solution and proofs
In this section we will describe a probabilistic scheme to realize the compartmented access structure Γ and give its proof.
New solution

The dealer generates a random polynomial
Each participant c ij from compartment C i will be identified by a unique public point (x ij , y ij ), where x ij = x il for j = l; y ij = y kl for (i, j) = (k, l). And his private share will be Q i (x ij , y ij ).
The scheme is similar with "Secret Sharing Scheme4" in [5] . The difference is that there are m random polynomials here, but only one in [5] . So we can do more things here. Obviously, this is an ideal scheme since the private shares of all users are taken from the domain of secrets F. The unknown variables are coefficients of all the polynomials R(y) and P i (x) (1 ≤ i ≤ m), the total number of these variables is t 0 . In view of the above, if any participants want to recover the secret S, they must recover every polynomial before-mentioned, so the total number of these participants is at least t 0 , and the members from C i is at least t i , in brief, this scheme agrees with the constraints in Γ . Such demonstration may not be convincingly enough, we proceed to give a strict proof.
Proofs
Theorem 1. If V ∈ Γ , it may recover the secret S with probability 1 − Cq −1 , where the constant C depends on t 0 , t 1 , · · · t m .
Proof. Let V be a minimal set in Γ , then |V| = t 0 . We assume that |V ∩
, · · · , c iki } and c ij is identified by the point (x ij , y ij ), then we can reduce the recover of the polynomials R(y) and P i (x) (1 ≤ i ≤ m) to the solution of the following linear equations:
Where
The pair of blocks M i and G i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, represents the equations that are contributed by the k i participants from compartment C i . They have the following form:
Here, M i is a block of size k i × t i , and G i is a block of size k i × l(We omit the trivial situation l = 0, so G always exists). Besides M i and G i , all the other places of M is 0. M is of size t 0 × t 0 . The unknown variables are the components of A. According to the knowledge of linear algebra, the equation (3) has only one solution only when det(M ) = 0, so the probability that we can solve A is equal to the probability that det(M ) = 0. Now we will consider the expansion of det(M ). Clearly, it has the following properties:
(1) det(M ) is a nonzero polynomial of 2t 0 variables over the finite field F.
(2) The highest degree of each of the variables in det(M ) is no larger than
According to Lemma 1, we may conclude that the number of zeros of det(M ) in F 2t0 is bounded by 2t 0 dq 2t0−1 , but in det(M ), the 2t 0 variables can have q 2t0
values. So the probability that det(M ) = 0 is bounded by 2t
We give an example here, suppose m = 3, t 0 = 9, t 1 = 2, t 2 = 2, t 3 = 3, 
and d = M AX(2, 2, 3, 2) = 3. We just give the form of M here, and it will be helpful to understand this theorem. In the next part of this section, we will use computer to illustrate the validity of the above theorem. We give the result in tables only, without any details. In the following two tables, q is the size of the finite field F, other parameters are as in above. The column of "Times" stands for how many experiments have we make, "Results" stands for the probability of det(M ) = 0 when we make experiments, "Theoretical" stands for the lower bound probability of det(M ) = 0 under Theorem 1 Table 1 . q = 4999 Parameters Times Results Theoretical t1 = 2, t2 = 3, m = 2 k1 = 3, k2 = 6, t0 = 9 10000 99.98% > 98.55% t1 = 1, t2 = 1, t3 = 1, m = 3 k1 = 1, k2 = 1, k3 = 2, t0 = 4 10000 99.96% > 99.83% t1 = 2, t2 = 2, t3 = 3, m = 3 k1 = 3, k2 = 2, k3 = 4, t0 = 9 10000 99.93% > 98.91%
From the tables above, we can see that if q is large enough, then we can recover the secret with probability very close to 1. That is, when q is larger, the probability will be closer to 1. The results is in accord with the theorem. It provide us with the information that if we want to put the above idea into practice, we must chose a enough large finite field F. Table 2 . q = 832809541
Parameters
Times Results Theoretical t1 = 2, t2 = 3, m = 2 k1 = 3, k2 = 6, t0 = 9 10000 100% > 1 − 9 × 10
Theorem 2. If V / ∈ Γ , then with probability 1 − Cq −1 it may not learn any information about the secret S, where the constant C depends on t 0 , t 1 , · · · , t m .
Proof. Assume that V / ∈ Γ , then we will have two situations to consider:
} and c ij is identified by the point (x ij , y ij ), consider the matrix as follows:
. . . . . . . . . . . .
M i is a matrix of size t i × t i . Solving the value of b i1 is equal to say that det(M ) = 0, but according to the property of vandermonde determinant, it is easy to conclude that det(M ) = 0. So we cannot get b i1 , nor can we recover the secret S. In the second case, without lose of generality, suppose |V| = t 0 − 1, define a t 0 dimension vector
e can be seen as a vector transformed from A, if we replace b i1 (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and a 1 by 1, replace other components by 0, we will get e. Similiarly as the proof of Theorem 1, we can get a matrix M ,the differences are: in (4) the size of M is t 0 × t 0 , but here M is of size (t 0 − 1) × t 0 . We need to show that the vector e is, most probably, not spanned by the rows of M . In order to show this, we augment M by adding to it the vector e as the first row and note the augmented matrix as M , we need to show that the probability of det(M ) = 0 is 1 − Cq −1 . The proof goes along the same as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Conclusions
We use the similar idea of [5] , give a probabilistic solution for the open problem proposed in [2] . The solution result from Tassa's idea, but easier than his. In practical application, q, the size of the finite field F, is large, so the value of 1 − Cq −1 is close to 1, which implies the practicability of this scheme. Moreover, ideality is a theoretic notation, in practical application, we need not restrict the scheme to ideality. In such case, the scheme proposed in the introduction of this paper will be a good choice.
